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Many commercial contracts' contain both a limited remedy pro-
vision and a consequential damage exclusion.2 A limited remedy
clause limits the Seller's liability under the contract; if the Seller de-
livers a defective product, his contractual obligation is to provide a
conforming product, by repairing or replacing the goods already de-
livered. A consequential damage exclusion clause further limits the
Seller's contractual liability. It provides that under all circumstances
the Buyer bears the risk of consequential loss.3 Even if the Seller
breaches the agreement, the exclusion bars the Buyer from recover-
ing consequential damages. Contracts with both limited -remedy
and consequential damage clauses limit the Buyer's remedy for the
Seller's breach of contract to repaired or replaced goods.
Contracts containing both a limited remedy clause and a conse-
quential damage exclusion present a difficult problem when the
Seller either refuses or is unable to perform4 the limited remedy of
I This note discusses only commercial transactions. Also, for simplicity, this note
refers to the parties as "Seller," the party who manufactured or supplied the defective
goods, and "Buyer," the party who purchased or received the defective goods from the
Seller. In most cases, the Buyer sues the Seller to recover damages once the limited
remedy has failed. The Seller, however, may initiate an action to recover the purchase
price of the goods. Because either party may initiate the action, this note avoids the
terms "Plaintiff" and "Defendant."
2 A typical contract clause which limits a Buyer's remedy to repair or replacement
and excludes consequential damage recovery may provide: "The Vendor warrants the
equipment sold hereunder to be free from defects in material or workmanship .... In
case of any such defects, Vendor's liability is limited to replacement ... of any material,
parts or equipment which may be defective .... Vendor assumes no liability for conse-
quential damages of any kind." Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F.
Supp. 39, 40 & n.2 (N.D. Il1. 1970).
3 Section 2-715 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines consequential damages
to include "(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the Seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978). Under cer-
tain circumstances, the Seller may not exclude consequential damages. For example, in
the case of consumer goods, the Seller may not exclude consequential damages for per-
sonal injury. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3). The restrictions placed on modifying and re-
scinding express and implied warranties are analogous. See U.C.C. § 2-316.
4 The Seller's breach of a contract by failing to perform the limited remedy does
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repair or replacement. In that case, if the contract bars consequent-
ial damage recovery, the Buyer is left with nonconforming goods
and no contractual remedy. This situation presents the issue of
whether the Buyer should be able to recover consequential dam-
ages, even though the contract prohibits their recover, when the
Seller fails to perform the only remedy (repair or replacement) con-
tractually available to the Buyer.
Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code addresses this
issue. Courts divide sharply on whether section 2-719 permits con-
sequential damage recovery despite an exclusion clause when the
seller cannot perform the limited remedy. Some courts award con-
sequential damages only if the exclusion clause is unconscionable,
regardless of the effectiveness of the repair or replacement remedy.5
This note refers to these courts as "independent courts." Other
courts automatically void the consequential damage exclusion
clause whenever the limited remedy is unavailable.6 This note re-
fers to these courts as "dependent courts." Neither approach, how-
ever, adequately resolves the issue.
This note proposes a hybrid method to determine the effect of a
failed limited remedy upon the validity of a consequential damage
exclusion. Under the hybrid method, when the limited remedy is
unavailable, a court should void the consequential damage exclu-
sion unless the contract otherwise provides a fair measure of relief
to the injured Buyer. By using a fact-specific inquiry into the par-
ties' intent, this method resolves the problems inherent in both cur-
rent approaches.
II
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT APPROACHES
Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code addresses con-
sequential damage exclusion and limited remedy clauses. This sec-
tion provides in pertinent part: "(2) Where the circumstances cause
an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem-
edy may be had as provided in this Act. (3) Consequential damages
may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is un-
conscionable."' 7 Currently, courts offer two distinct interpretations
not prevent him from seeking protection under the consequential damage exclusion
clause. For a general discussion of the role of agreed remedies in damage calculation,
see E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs §§ 12.8-.9, 12.18 (1982). See also infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the equitable concerns raised by allowing the
Seller to claim protection under the consequential damage exclusion after he has repu-
diated the agreement by failing to perform the limited remedy.
5 See infra notes 9-41 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.





Independent courts evaluate consequential damage exclusion
and limited remedy clauses in the same agreement as independent
of each other." These courts void the consequential damage exclu-
sion only if the exclusion is unconscionable, regardless of whether a
limited remedy in the same agreement has failed of its essential pur-
pose.9 Thus, the Buyer recovers consequential damages only if he
can establish the unconscionability of the consequential damage ex-
clusion. The Seller's failure to honor the limited remedy clause
does not affect the validity of the consequential damage exclusion.
Independent courts interpret the remedy clauses literally and
interpret section 2-719 narrowly to justify their approach. Under
this view, if the contract does not expressly condition the validity of
the consequential damage exclusion upon the availability of the lim-
ited remedy, the failure of the latter does not automatically invali-
date the former.10 These courts further reason that since 2-719
provides two separate subsections with two distinct standards for
evaluating consequential damage and limited remedy clauses, each
clause must be evaluated separately under the appropriate stan-
dard."I Finally, independent courts interpret official comment 3 to
section 2-719, which provides that a consequential damage exclu-
sion is "merely an allocation of unknown and indeterminable
risks," 12 to shift the risk of consequential loss to the Buyer unless
evidence of unconscionability exists.1 3
Some commentatary supports the independent courts' ap-
8 See, e.g., Kaplan v. RCA Corp., 783 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1986) (even if remedy
of repair or replacement failed of its essential purpose, plaintiffs entitled only to alterna-
tive remedy provided for in contract-the refund of purchase price); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457
U.S. 112 (1982) (disclaimer of consequential damages must be evaluated on its own
merits); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978)
(failure of limited remedy to serve its purpose does not require permitting recovery of
consequential damages).
9 See, e.g., Kaplan, 783 F.2d at 467 ("[A] finding that the repair and replacement
warranty had failed would not void [the] exclusion of consequential damages provisions
as well."); Chatlos Sys., 635 F.2d at 1083 ("Although we accept the determination on the
failure of the contractual remedy, we do not agree that the disclaimer of consequential
damages is ineffective as a result .... [t]hat clause must be evaluated on its own mer-
its."); S.AL HWilson & Co., 587 F.2d at 1375 ("[Ihe issue remains whether the failure of
the limited repair remedy ... requires permitting the recovery of consequential dam-
ages .... We hold it does not.").
10 See iifra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
12 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3.
I3 See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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proach. 14 The approach, though facially logical, is inherently weak;
it relies on imprecise assumptions about the parties' intent and an
unpersuasive interpretation of section 2-719.
1. Contract Interpretation
Independent courts justify their approach by a strictly literal
construction of the parties' agreement.15 Because the parties typi-
cally draft the consequential damage exclusion and limited remedy
clauses in two separate contract provisions with no language condi-
tioning the validity of the exclusion clause upon the availability of
the limited remedy, independent courts reason that the clauses must
be considered separately.16 Independent courts assert that the par-
ties' decision to draft the remedy clauses separately demonstrates an
intent to unconditionally shift the risk of consequential loss to the
Buyer.' 7
Cayuga Harvester v. Allis Chalmers Corp. 18 illustrates the independ-
ent courts' approach to interpreting the parties agreement. In that
case, the contract provided that "[t]he company's liability... shall
be limited exclusively to repairing or replacing parts ... and in no
event will the company be liable for consequential damages."'19 The
court interpreted the consequential damage exclusion and the lim-
ited remedy clause independently because "no wording in the [con-
tract] itself indicates that the provisions are interrelated or that the
failure of defendant to adequately perform under the repair or re-
place warranty deprives it of the protection of the consequential
14 See, e.g., Eddy, On the "Essential" Purpose of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC
2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 92 (1977) (stating that the effect of failure of the essential
purpose and validity of the consequential damage exclusion are separable and in-
dependent); Note, Commercial Transactions: UCC § 2-719: Remedy Limitations and Consequent-
ial Damage Exclusions, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 670, 677 (1983) ("[A] consequential damages
disclaimer should be governed by its own Code standard of unconscionability, in-
dependent of whether a limited remedy has failed.").
15 See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 788 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (a consequential damage exclusion clause separate and distinct from a limitation
of remedy to repair must receive separate consideration); American Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no reason to disturb con-
sensual allocation of business risk embodied in separate contract provisions).
16 See, e.g., Cayuga Harvester v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 14, 465
N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (1983) (no wording in the clause itself "indicates that the provisions
are interrelated or that the failure of [the Seller] to perform under to repair and replace-
ment warranty deprives it of the protection of the consequential damage exclusion.).
17 See, e.g., Office Supply Co., 538 F. Supp. at 787-88 ("Even if the repair remedy fails
of its essential purpose, the buyer is limited to his breach of the bargain damages . ..
unless he can prove that the exclusion of incidental and consequential damages was
unconscionable."); Cayuga Harvester, 95 A.D.2d at 14, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 613 ("It defies
reason to suppose the [the Seller] could have intended to assume [consequential dam-
ages] risks.").
18 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983).
19 Id. at 13, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
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damage exclusion." 20 Additionally, the court noted that the most
plausible risk allocation to be drawn from such contract language
was that the defendant did not assume the risk of consequential loss
in the face of a failed limited remedy.2'
The independent courts' literal construction of the parties' con-
tract encourages overly formalistic drafting. Under this approach,
the mere existence of two separate clauses not expressly condi-
tioned upon each other requires an independent construction of
each clause. This approach creates several problems. First, it re-
quires the parties to explicitly address the effect of a failed limited
remedy upon the validity of the consequential damage exclusion to
ensure that a court will later respect their intent. Parties may antici-
pate the failure of a limited remedy, but few will be able to draft a
workable remedy. Second, overly formalistic contract interpretation
unfairly favors the party who can afford sophisticated bargaining
techniques to ensure the use of his contract terms. Consequently,
the party with greater resources can impose his contract terms on
the other party. The contract terms will rarely reflect the true intent
of the party with fewer resources because he can not afford the re-
sources required to incorporate his terms into the agreement. 22
Furthermore, independent courts mistakenly presume that the
contract demonstrates the parties' intent that the Buyer bear the risk
of consequential loss when the limited remedy fails. A consequent-
ial damage exclusion by itself demonstrates some intent to shift the
risk of consequential loss to the Buyer in case of breach. 23 When
coupled with a separate limited remedy clause, however, a conse-
quential damage limitation does not conclusively establish the par-
ties' intent to allocate the risk of consequential loss to the Buyer
20 Id. at 14, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
21 Id. at 14-15, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
22 Some may argue that the Buyer should have bargained for more appropriate
terms if his intent differed from the literal language of the contract. Under this view,
courts that infer intent not expressed in the contract language improperly engage in a
paternalistic effort to protect the Buyer from his own incompetently bargained agree-
ment. While it may be theoretically correct, this argument ignores the practical difficul-
ties of contract interpretation that the widespread use of form contracts in commercial
transactions raises. Often, the Seller imposes its form language on the Buyer. The
Buyer can not secure terms that demonstrate his willingness to assume the risk of conse-
quential loss only if the limited remedy is available. For a complete discussion of the
impact of form contracts on contract interpretation, see infra notes 46-48 and accompa-
nying text. See also Dusenberg, Unifom Commercial Code Annual Survey: Sales & Bulk Trans-
fers, 37 Bus. LAw. 949, 961 (1982) (suggesting that the best way to avoid the section 2-
719 conflict is to provide a limited remedy which never fails, such as a return of the
purchase price).
23 Conceivably, a consequential damage exclusion coupled with a limited remedy
shows some intent to shift the risk of consequential loss to the Buyer while the limited
remedy remains effective. When the limited remedy fails, however, the damage exclu-
sion itself does not demonstrate the intended risk allocation.
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when the limited remedy fails. The language structure itself does
not indicate that the parties even considered the possibility of the
ineffective limited remedy. Moreover, the language fails to address
any intended consequences of the unavailability, as opposed to the
failure, of the limited remedy. Since the contract does not set forth
the interaction of the two clauses upon failure of the limited rem-
edy, courts should not presume from the mere existence of two sep-
arate clauses that the Buyer bears the entire risk.
2. Interpretation of Section 2-719
Independent courts interpret section 2-719 narrowly to support
their approach. Because the Code sets out two distinct standards in
two separate subsections for evaluating consequential damage ex-
clusion and limited remedy clauses, independent courts evaluate the
two contract clauses separately. 24 They apply section 2-719(2)'s
failure-of-essential-purpose test to determine the validity of the lim-
ited remedy. Regardless of the validity of the limited remedy, the
courts then evaluate the consequential damage exclusion under the
unconscionability standard of section 2-719(3). Under the in-
dependent theory, the effectiveness of the limited remedy does not
affect the validity of the consequential damage clause.
Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center25 illustrates the independent
courts' interpretation of section 2-719. In Carboline, the parties' con-
tract limited the Seller's liability to repair or replacement, and ex-
cluded consequential damage recovery. Because the damage
exclusion itself was not unconscionable, the court refused to award
the Buyer consequential damages even though the limited remedy
had failed.26 Because the court interpreted sections 2-719(2) and 2-
719(3) as "mutually exclusive," 27 the limited remedy's failure did
"not necessarily invalidate a separate provision of [the] agreement
excluding liability for consequential damages." 28 The court denied
the Buyer consequential damages after it concluded that the exclu-
sion clause was not unconscionable. 29
The independent courts' interpretation of section 2-719 ig-
24 See, e.g., Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1728, 1733 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1985) ("the provisions of [Section 2-719(2)] governing rights on a failure of
essential purpose, and the provision of [Section 2-719(3)] authorizing an express limita-
tion on consequential damages are mutually exclusive"); Cayuga Harvester v. Allis-Chal-
mers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 14, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (1983) (recognizing that the Code
has two separate standards for evaluating consequential damage exclusions and limited
remedies).
25 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
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nores the specific purpose of the section and the general goal of
Article 2. Generally, Article 2 promotes freedom of contract and
allows the parties to formulate their own agreement.30 Section 2-
719 tempers this general freedom by requiring that the breaching
party fairly compensate the injured party for breach of the con-
tract.31 Thus, courts should interpret section 2-719 to require fair
compensation in case of breach, yet respect the parties' prerogative
to exclude consequential damages.
Moreover, evaluating a consequential damage exclusion clause
and a limited remedy clause by the separate standards given in sec-
tion 2-719 improperly divides the transaction into distinct time peri-
ods. 32 An example illustrates this problem. When a Buyer sues a
breaching Seller for compensation under a contract, the court must
first evaluate the limited remedy clause under section 2-719(2)'s fail-
ure-of-essential-purpose standard. The official comments to section
2-719 provide that "where an apparently fair and reasonable clause
because of circumstances fails in its purpose .... it must give way to the
general remedy provisions of this Article." 33 This comment sug-
gests that a court should focus on events that occurred after the par-
ties entered the contract to determine if the limited remedy failed of
its essential purpose. The court then must evaluate the consequent-
ial damage exclusion clause by the unconscionability standard of
section 2-719(3). Unlike the failure-of-essential-purpose test, the
unconscionability test focuses solely on events surrounding the for-
mation of the contract. Unconscionability requires overreaching or
oppression by the Seller when the parties formed the contract.34 By
30 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-719 (damage limitations), 2-316 (exclusion and modification
of warranties).
31 See U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (parties "must accept the legal consequences that
there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties out-
lined in the contract").
32 Several commentators recognize the error of evaluating each remedy clause by
events in a separate time period. See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 14, at 31 ("Contract clauses
do not change their scope of application, having one application at the time of formation
and another at the time of decision. Therefore it is not strictly accurate to speak of an
'initially' fair remedy that 'later' operates unfairly."). But see Fahlgren, Unconscionability:
Warranty Disclaimeis and Consequential Damage Limitations, 20 ST. Louis U.LJ. 435, 456
(1976) ("exclusion of consequential damages may become unconscionable due to seller's
failure to live up to his express warranty") (emphasis in original).
33 U.C.C. § 2-719. See also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 4.28, at 317-18 ("[2-
719(2)] seems intended for a situation in which unexpected circumstances cause a clause
that did not seem oppressive at its inception to misfire."); Note, supra note 14, at 674
(when goods develop various defects, and the Seller is either unable or unwilling to
perform his sale repair or replacement, then the limited remedy will likely failed of its
essential purpose).
34 The Code provisions addressing unconscionability do not define the concept.
U.C.C. 99 2-302, 2-719. For a definition of unconscionability, see generally E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 4, § 4.28, at 314-16 ("[u]nconscionability is broadly conceived to en-
compass not only the employment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and
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focusing on events occuring after the contract formation when eval-
uating the limited remedy provision, but focusing exclusively on
events surrounding the contract formation when evaluating the con-
sequential damage exclusion, independent courts analyze the lim-
ited remedy and consequential damage exclusion clauses from two
different time perspectives. 35
Evaluating the contract clauses under two time periods
prejudices the injured buyer because the unconscionability inquiry,
by definition, ignores the very events that required the court to eval-
uate the consequential damage exclusion clause-the events that
caused the limited remedy to fail. Courts need to evaluate conse-
quential damage exclusions only after they determine that a limited
remedy failed to provide the Buyer with an adequate remedy. Yet,
independent courts ignore the events that made the limited remedy
inadequate when they evaluate the consequential damage exclusion
in terms of the events of the contract formation. To compensate the
Buyer fairly, courts should consider the events after the parties
enter the contract in evaluating the consequential damage
exclusion.
The inquiry ultimately focuses on the fairness of the Buyer's
recovery. 36 Subsequent events bear directly on the fairness of the
Buyer's recovery, and courts should consider these events in evalu-
ating a consequential damage exclusion. Even if a consequential
damage exclusion clause is conscionable, the Buyer may not be
fairly compensated without receiving consequential damages. The
independent courts produce an inequitable result when they fail to
consider the consequential damage clause in light of the events that
required an evaluation of the exclusion.
3. Presumed Risk Allocation
Finally, independent courts justify their approach by presuming
that because a contract contains a consequential damage exclusion
clause, the risk of consequential loss in any situation, including fail-
ure of a limited remedy, most properly belongs to the Buypr. The
convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequity of bargaining
power."); Eddy, supra note 14, at 41 (suggesting that the unconscionability test should
be applied "at the time [the contract] was made"); Fahlgren, supra note 32, at 456 (ele-
ments of unconscionability include: one party misled as to the nature of the bargain,
severe imbalance of bargaining power, specific terms appear outrageous).
35 Essentially, these courts consider subsequent events in evaluating the limited
remedy, but limit their inquiry to conditions at the formation of the contract when deter-
mining the validity of the consequential damage exclusion.
36 For a discussion of the appropriate standard for reviewing a consequential dam-
age limitation in light of a failed limited remedy, see infra notes 61-72 and accompanying
text.
366 [Vol. 74:359
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Cayuga Harvester3 7 court relied on the presence of a consequential
damage exclusion clause in the contract to deny the Buyer recovery.
Independent courts mistakenly rely on section 2-719's official com-
ments to establish a presumptive risk allocation. While the com-
ments recognize that a consequential damage exclusion clause is
"merely an allocation of unknown and indeterminable risks,"38 they
do not suggest which party assumes the risk when a limited remedy
fails. They merely state a truism-a consequential damage exclu-
sion clause is a risk allocation device. The comments do not indi-
cate which party bears the risk under all circumstances, nor do they
support a presumption of risk allocation.
4. Other Concerns
Secondary concerns also undermine the independent courts'
approach. Specifically, many courts presume the conscionability of
terms in commercial contracts and place the burden of proof upon
the Buyer to establish unconscionability.3 9 The independent courts'
use of an unconscionability standard that focuses only on events at
the time the parties entered the contract, coupled with a presump-
tion of conscionability, essentially precludes a commercial Buyer
from recovering consequential damages upon the failure of a lim-
ited remedy.40 The Buyer has the difficult task of overcoming the
37 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983). (The court relied on the official com-
ments to section 2-719 to support its argument.)
38 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3.
39 See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (exclusion of consequential damages presumed valid in a commercial context);
County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1309
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 444 F.2d 372 (1971) ("[lIt is the exceptional commercial setting
where a claim of unconscionability will be allowed."); Billings v.Joseph Harris Co., Inc.,
27 N.C. App. 689, 220 S.E.2d 361 (1975), aff'd 290 N.C. 502, 226 S.E.2d 321 (1976)
(burden on the Buyer to show unconscionability in a commercial context).
40 Independent courts rarely invalidate a consequential damage exclusion clause.
When courts invalidate a damage exclusion, the cases usually involve consumers-where
unconscionability is more easily established, or acts of oppression or unfair surprise in
the commercial context. See, e.g., Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587 (4th
Cir. 1985) (consumer allowed to recover lost profits when Seller unable to repair or
replace defective machinery); Kelynak v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 152 Mich. App. 102
(1986) (consumer allowed to rescind contract for purchase of motorcycle after repair
prevented thirteen weeks of use).
Commentators recognize the problems created by the independent courts' use of a
limited unconscionability standard to evaluate a consequential damage limitation clause
coupled with a presumption of conscionability in commercial settings. See generally Eddy,
supra note 14, at 41 ("[S]ection 2-719(3) ... makes an unconscionability attack upon a
clause excluding consequential economic loss considerably more difficult than it might
have been under section 2-302 alone."); Fahlgren. supra note 32, at 445 n.83 (suggesting
that the language of section 2-719(3) itself creates a presumption of conscionability in
commercial transactions).
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presumption of conscionability. 4'
B. Dependent Courts
In contrast to independent courts, dependent courts evaluate
consequential damage exclusion clauses as necessarily dependent
upon the availability of the limited remedy clause in the same agree-
ment.42 Dependent courts follow a two-step analysis. First, they
evaluate the limited remedy under section 2-719(2) to determine if
the clause has failed of its essential purpose. If the limited remedy
has failed, the consequential damage exclusion is automatically void.
If the limited remedy is effective, however, the Buyer must show that
the consequential damage exclusion is unconscionable to recover.
Thus, the enforceability of the consequential damage exclusion de-
pends on the effectiveness of the limited remedy; the courts analyze
the clauses as dependent upon each other.
Dependent courts rely on a presumption about the Buyer's in-
tent, a literal interpretation of section 2-719, and equity to justify
their approach. Dependent courts presume that a Buyer will only
disclaim consequential damage recovery on the assumption that the
Seller will perform the limited remedy promised under the contract.
Dependent courts use this presumption as the first step in interpret-
ing the parties contract. Second, dependent courts interpret section
2-719 to make all Code remedies available upon the failure of a lim-
ited remedy. Third, dependent courts rely on the equitable princi-
ple that a consequential damage exclusion clause shall not protect a
Seller from consequential damages he caused in repudiating a lim-
ited remedy in the same agreement. Although it reflects the true
intent of the parties more closely, the dependent courts' approach
suffers from weaknesses similar to those of the independent courts'
approach.
41 For a discussion of the process of proof involving a judicially created presump-
tion, see generally I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE $ 301 (1986) (defining judi-
cial presumptions and their effects on the burden of proof); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2488 (chadbourn rev. 1981) (defining tests for ascertain the burden of proof given a
judicial presumption).
42 See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 272 (8th
Cir. 1985) (a failed limited remedy voids the consequential damage disclaimer); Matco
Mach. & Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1984)
("[Wlhere circumstances cause an exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose, the
Buyer may recover direct damages as well as consequential damages notwithstanding an
express provision excluding such damages); Soo Line R.R. v. Freuhauf Corp., 547 F.2d
1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[D]espite the fact that limited remedy failed of its essential
purpose, contract did not effectively bar consequential recovery."). See also Fahlgren,
supra note 32, at 456 (suggesting failure of a limited remedy overcomes the presumption




Dependent courts begin by presuming that the parties intended to
link the consequential damage exclusion and limited remedy.43
They recognize that a rational Buyer may agree to assume the risk of
consequential loss to secure a promise of repair or replacement.
Dependent courts further presume, however, that a rational Buyer
would not enter such an agreement if the limited remedy he ac-
cepted as his exclusive remedy would be unavailable. Conse-
quently, dependent courts conclude that the parties intended the
validity of the consequential damage exclusion to depend on the ef-
fectiveness of the limited remedy; if the limited remedy fails, so does
the consequential damage exclusion.
Although the dependent courts' approach may more closely ap-
proximate the actual intent of most commercial parties, it suffers
from defects similar to those encountered under the independent
courts' approach. It fosters overly formalistic drafting and under-
mines the actual intent of the parties. 44 Any presumption of intent
requires the parties to expressly address the effect of a failed limited
remedy on the availability of consequential damages or risk a judi-
cially imposed intent. Moreover, a contract that does not address a
given contingency offers an inadequate basis for any presumption of
intent.45
The widespread use of standard form contracts in commercial
transactions further undermines both the independent and depen-
dent courts' sole reliance on contract language to determine the
parties' intended allocation of consequential loss upon the failure of
a limited remedy. Standard form contracts often contain both lim-
43 See, e.g., Soo Line R.R., 547 F.2d at 1373 (recognizing that a "Buyer, when enter-
ing into a contract, does not anticipate the sole remedy available to him will be rendered
a nullity"); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (Buyer had knowledge of Seller's limited liability, but was entitled to assume that
the Seller would not unreasonably refuse to make good on the repair or replace rem-
edy); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1970) (Buyer
purchased with knowledge of the limited remedy, but could not have known Seller
would unreasonably refuse to honor his obligations of repair or replacement); Kearney
& Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 211 N.J. Super. 376, 511 A.2d 1227 (1986)
(risk allocation achieved by excluding consequential damages inextricably linked to limi-
tation of remedies).
44 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
45 Neither independent nor dependent courts enforce the true intent of the parties.
Instead, they rely on presumed intent which the contract language inadequately sup-
ports. The independent courts' literal interpretation yields a presumption that the
Buyer assumed the risk of consequential loss under all circumstances, regardless of the
availability of the limited remedy. Dependent courts presume that a rational Buyer
would never agree to forego consequential damage recovery if his sole remedy of repair
or replacement would be unavailable. When a limited remedy fails, the courts simply
cannot presume the parties' intended risk allocation of consequential damage from the
contract alone.
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ited remedy and consequential damage exclusion clauses. 46 The
use of pre-drafted forms, rather than documents specifically tailored
to meet the individual requirements of a transaction, complicates
contractual interpretation because parties often agree to the pre-
drafted language with little or no bargaining. Often, the Seller can
impose its form contract on the Buyer because of its superior bar-
gaining position. When this occurs, the terms may fail to adequately
reveal the actual agreement of the parties.47 Thus, standard form
language often fails to demonstrate the parties' true intent. Under
such circumstances, the contractual language itself provides an in-
sufficient basis from which courts can presume intent.48
2. Application of Section 2-719
Dependent courts also justify their approach by interpreting
section 2-719(2) literally to require the availability of all Code reme-
dies whenever a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.49 De-
pendent courts focus exclusively on the language of section 2-
719(2), which provides that "where circumstances cause an exclu-
sive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may
be had as provided in this Act." 50 Whenever the limited remedy
fails dependent courts use section 2-715, which provides for conse-
quential damage recovery, to grant the injured Buyer relief 51 re-
46 A majority of the cases cited in this note use form contracts. See supra note 2 for
an example of form contract language used to limit remedies and exclude consequential
damage recovery.
47 For a discussion of the impact of form contracts on the Buyer's ability to secure
contract language which adequately evidences his intent, see supra note 22.
48 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(2) (1979) (a standard form contract
"is interpreted whenever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without
regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms in the writing"); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.12, at 501 ("[The rule of Restatement § 211(2)] plainly
subordinates the meaning that an individual party may have attached to the contract
language to the goal of equality of treatment for parties who are similarly situated.").
49 See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Freuhauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977)
(the "fundamental intent of section 2-719(2) reflects that a remedial limitation's failure
of essential purpose makes available all contractual remedies, including consequential
damages"); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 44 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (the comments to section 2-719 indicate that the failure of the Seller to meet its
repair or replacement obligations under the contract should deprive it of the benefits of
the consequential damage exclusion).
50 U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (emphasis added).
51 See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 272-73
(8th Cir. 1985) (a failed limited remedy voids the consequential damage disclaimer);
Matco Mach. & Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1984)
(a Buyer may recover consequential damages whenever an exclusive remedy fails of its
essential purpose regardless of a consequential damage exclusion in the same agree-
ment); Soo Line R.R., 547 F.2d at 1373 (holding that a damage exclusion clause does not
bar consequential damage recovery if the limited remedy fails of its essential purpose).
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gardless of any remedy limitation in the contract itself.52
The language of section 2-719, however, does not support the
dependent courts' interpretation. The Code permits parties to limit
their remedies and encourages freedom of contract.53 Consistent
with this broad objective, courts should interpret the "remedy pro-
vided" by the Act to include contractual remedy limitations. Fur-
thermore, the comments to section 2-719 do not suggest that courts
should automatically void all contractual remedy exclusions when-
ever a limited remedy fails. 54 The comments merely require a "fair
quantum of relief" given the "essential bargain of the parties." 55
This flexible standard falls far short of requiring courts to invalidate
all damage exclusion clauses upon the failure of a limited remedy.
Courts should interpret section 2-719(2) to require less than a com-
plete invalidation of a consequential damage exclusion upon failure
of a limited remedy.
3. Equity
Dependent courts rely on equity as a final justification for their
approach. They reason that fairness prohibits the Seller from claim-
ing the protection of a consequential damage limitation after he
caused the consequential damages complained of by repudiating the
limited remedy in the same agreement.56 To implement their con-
52 This interpretation of section 2-719 also ignores the general purpose of Article 2
and the specific purpose of this section. For a complete discussion of the purposes of
section 2-719, see supra note 33.
53 For the Code authority that permits parties to limit contractual remedies for
breach, see U.C.C. §§ 2-719(1) ("the agreement may... limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this Article"), 2-316(4) ("remedies for breach of warranty
can be limited in accordance with [§§ 2-718 and 2-719]"), 2-316 comment 2 ("This Arti-
cle treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting
remedies for breach, separate from the matter of creation of liability under a war-
ranty."). See also Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Damages for Breach of
H'arranty Under the UCC, 53 TEx. L. REV. 60, 75 (1974) (noting that the Code distin-
guishes between exclusions of warranties and limitations or exclusions of damages for
breach of an existing warranty).
54 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (it is the "very essence of a sales contract that at least
minimum adequate remedies ... [and] at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of
the obligations or duties outlined in the contract [be available]").
55 U.C.C. § 2-719 comments 1-3.
56 See. e.g., Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 890 (E.D. Minn. 1974)
(noting that "it would not be equitable to allow the seller to refuse to perform the one
remedy available to the buyer and then be freed of any responsibility caused by this
failure"); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (holding that "the court would be in an untenable position if it allowed the
[Seller] to shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty when it allegedly repudiated
and ignored its very limited obligations under another segment of the same [agree-
ment]"); Adams v.J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388. 261 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1970) (only if the
Seller reasonably complies with the limited remedy can he claim the benefit of the con-
sequential damage exclusion).
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cept of fairness, dependent courts automatically void a damage ex-
clusion whenever a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.
Dependent courts typically award consequential damages, however,
only in factually compelling situations, 57 such as when the Seller
willfully breaches the agreement.58
Awarding consequential damages because the Seller willfully
breached the agreement confuses consequential damages with puni-
tive damages. 59 Consequential damages, by definition, compensate
the Buyer for injury flowing from the Seller's breach. Punitive dam-
ages, on the other hand, punish the injuring party for particularly
egregious behavior.60 Traditionally, punitive damages are not avail-
able for breach of contract.6' Dependent courts, by focusing exclu-
sively on the Seller's conduct, condition the availability of
consequential damages on the harshness of the Seller's behavior
rather than on the injury the Buyer suffers. Awarding consequent-
ial damages because of the Seller's behavior, rather than the Buyer's
injury, transforms consequential damages into punitive damages.62
In addition, by basing their award on the facts of the situation,
courts can achieve more equitable results. While the Seller's con-
duct may influence the recovery, circumstances may not require the
57 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814,
817 (1984) (Seller's failure to repair machinery as provided under the contract resulted
in 68 days down-time); Adams v.J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App.2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1, 10
(1970) (Seller's refusal to repair machinery as provided under the contract caused 810
lost hours of operation).
58 Dusenberg, supra note 22, at 960 (suggesting that a court's award of consequent-
ial damages "seems often to be affected by the good faith of the seller in attempting to
comply with the remedy, as distinguished from where he is willfully recalcitrant").
59 Many commentators also erroneously equate consequential damages with puni-
tive damages. See, e.g., Note, RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc.: Is the Ninth Circuit's
Inconsequential Treatment of Consequential Damages Limitations Under U.C.C. § 2-719 Uncon-
scionable?, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 181 (1986) (suggesting that courts should render a conse-
quential damage exclusion clause unenforceable whenever the Seller willfully refuses to
repair or replace the defective goods); Note, supra note 14, at 681 (suggesting that
courts who treat consequential damage exclusions as dependent upon limited rem-
edies rely on a willful-refusal-to-perform-causes-the-consequential-damages-alleged
argument).
60 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1977) ("Punitive damages are damages,
other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in
the future.").
61 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355 (1979) ("Punitive damages are not re-
coverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a
tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.").
62 This argument does not suggest that the Seller's conduct should not influence an
equitable determination of the availability of consequential damages. Rather, it suggests
that a court should not rely exclusively on the Seller's conduct in fashioning an equitable
remedy. Many factors beyond the Seller's conduct bear on whether a Buyer has received
fair compensation for his injuries. Indeed, a Seller who could not perform the limited
remedy may be liable for consequential damages even if his breach was not willful.
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court to void the consequential damage exclusion completely. For
example, the court could award only the consequential damages suf-
fered after the Seller is given a reasonable time to repair or replace,
the consequential damages stemming directly from the failed lim-
ited remedy, or the consequential damages that the Buyer could not
reasonably avoid. All these remedies more fully serve the depen-
dent courts' equitable goal.
III
HYBRID METHOD
A. Description of the Method
The problems inherent in both the independent and dependent
courts' approaches illustrate the need to develop another method
for evaluating the validity of a consequential damage exclusion
clause upon the failure of a limited remedy in the same agreement.
The hybrid method represents one method designed to alleviate the
shortcomings of both current approaches. Under the hybrid
method, a consequential damage exclusion is void when a limited
remedy fails unless the contract provides the Buyer a fair measure of
relief given the purpose of the parties' bargain.63
The hybrid method requires a multi-step application. First, a
court must determine the purpose of the parties' bargain. Specifi-
cally, the court must ascertain as nearly as possible the intended al-
location of consequential loss upon the failure of the limited
remedy. 4 This analysis requries a fact-specific inquiry.65 The con-
63 Several courts use an approach similar to the hybrid method. See, e.g., RRX In-
dus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1985) (awarding consequential
damages because the "facts justify the result"); Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Freuhauf Corp., 747
F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1984) (consequential damages awarded on the theory that
"[U]udging each case and each contract on its own merits will better allow courts to give
effect to the parties' intentions regarding the risk allocation and will lead less frequently
to unjust results"); AES Technological Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933,
940 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that "[a]n analysis to determine whether consequential
damages are warranted must carefully examine the individual factual situation" and not-
ing that "[t]he purpose of the courts.., is not to rewrite contracts .... Rather it is to
interpret the existing contract as fairly as possible"); Agristar Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin,
601 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (D. Or. 1985) (notwithstanding contractual language barring
their recovery, courts should determine whether or not consequential damages are avail-
able in light of the relevant facts of the case).
64 This method proceeds on the assumption that the parties actually considered the
possibility of a limited remedy and formed an intent with regard to the allocation of
consequential damages under these circumstances. Conceivably, some parties never
consider, much less form an intent, about such circumstances. This note recognizes that
such cases exist, and limits the hybrid method analysis to those cases where the parties
actually intended a consequential damage allocation.
65 The use of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intended effect of the
failed limited remedy on the validity of the consequential damage disclaimer does not
violate the parol evidence rule. See U.C.C. § 2-202, which provides that the contract
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tract itself provides some evidence of the parties' bargain. If the
language is unclear, however, the court must supplement the con-
tract provisions with other evidence to determine the parties' in-
tended risk allocation upon failure of a limited remedy.66
After determining the parties' risk allocation and concluding
that the limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, 67 the
court must decide whether the contract, as written, provides a fair
measure of relief68 to the Buyer. The unconscionability standard
applied by independent courts provides a floor on fair compensa-
tion; to provide fair relief to the injured Buyer a court must void any
consequential damage exclusion extracted by oppression or unfair
surprise. Beyond the unconscionability floor, however, the equita-
ble concept of fair relief is more difficult to define. A court should
consider several factors to determine whether the contractual reme-
dies fairly compensate the injured Buyer.69 A court it should con-
sider the availability of the goods promised from alternative
sources, the degree to which the current unavailability of the prod-
uct aggravates the Buyer's damages, whether the parties could have
reasonably anticipated the contingency that caused the limited rem-
edy to fail at the time they decided to exclude consequential dam-
ages, whether the act that caused the limited remedy to fail also
resulted in the consequential loss, the adequacy of the recovery
may be "explained or supplemented" by extrinsic evidence. See generally E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 4, at §§ 7.3, 7.8; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-9 (3d ed. 1988).
66 A contract that does not clearly demonstrate intent is vague and should be sup-
plemented by extrinsic evidence.
67 This note addresses the validity of a consequential damage exclusion clause
when a limited remedy fails to achieve its essential purpose. Thus, this note does not
discuss the standard for determining whether a limited remedy has so failed. For a gen-
eral discussion of the standards courts use to determine whether a limited remedy has
failed of its essential purpose, see Note, supra note 14, at 674 (suggesting that a limited
remedy fails of its essential purpose whenever the Seller is either unable or unwilling to
make good on the repair or replace remedy, or when the Seller does repair or replace,
but does so in an unreasonable period of time).
68 The "fair relief" standard of the hybrid method, like any other standard based
on equitable principles, is inherently flexible and imprecise.
69 Commentators have suggested many standards for awarding consequential dam-
ages upon the failure of the limited remedy in the same agreement. See Anderson, Fail-
ure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 31 Sw. LJ. 759, 776-77 (1977) (suggesting that a consequential damage
limitation is unconscionable "[i]f there is a direct causal relationship between the failure
of the exclusive remedy and the occurrence of consequential damages which the buyer
had not agreed to assume"); Note, The Validity of Consequential Damage Disclaimers Following
Failure of Essential Purpose of an Exclusive Remedy: S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 33
Sw. L.J. 930, 934 (1979) (suggesting that "an exclusion of consequential damages
should be unenforceable upon failure of [the] essential purpose of an exclusive remedy
only if in those cases where the seller's refusal or inability to perfect the exclusive rem-
edy directly caused consequential damages that the buyer did not agree to assume").
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without consequential damages, and the Seller's conduct. 70
The fair measure of relief standard does not require a court to
award or deny the Buyer all the consequential damages he seeks.
Rather, the standard gives a court the flexibility to award the most
appropriate amount of damages under the circumstances. 7t In ex-
treme cases, a court will either award or withhold all consequential
damages. More often, however, a court must carefully weigh the
circumstances in each case and award the amount of consequential
damages that fairly compensates the Buyer. 72
A few hypotheticals illustrate the application of the fair measure
of relief standard. Some circumstances justify an award of all the
Buyer's consequential damages. Assume a Seller's breach of a lim-
ited remedy provision directly results in the Buyer's consequential
loss. For example, assume that the Buyer of a machine notifies the
Seller that the machine has malfunctioned and the Seller promises
to repair the machine within one week. The Buyer waits this week in
good faith reliance on the Seller's promise to repair. During this
period, the Buyer incurs consequential damages. At the week's end,
the Buyer contacts the Seller and again requests that he repair the
machine; the Seller refuses. Because the same act that caused the
70 Commentators have suggested a similar balance. See, e.g., Foss, When to Apply the
Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of Consequential Damages: An Objective
Approach, 25 DuQ. L. REV. 551 (1987) (suggesting that various factors influence the valid-
ity of a consequential damage exclusion clause).
71 Courts, of course, can award damages flexibly under any approach. Under the
independent and dependent courts' approaches, however, courts award either full re-
covery of consequential damages or no recovery at all. This dichotomy ignores the cir-




The linear equation Y AiXi best conceptualizes the hybrid method's
x=1
approach to calculating consequential damage recovery. In this equation, Xi represents
the factors a court should consider. The degree to which each factor is present in a case
determines the value of the Xi variable. For example, if the goods promised under the
contract are unavailable from another source, a court may assign this factor the weight
of 10 on a scale of I through 10. If the goods are available, however, but only at great
expense to the Buyer, a court may assign the weight of 8 on the 10 point scale. Finally, if
the goods are readily available in the open market, a court may assign a weight of only 2.
The coefficient Ai represents the degree of importance the courts attach to each factor.
A court that finds that the current availability of goods is more important than the
Seller's conduct would assign a larger coefficient to the weight it attributes to the availa-
bility of the goods.
After the court has assigned all the appropriate values, the summation yields a value
corresponding to a percentage of the total recovery possible where all the consequential
damages represent the maximum possible AiXi value. This approach permits a variable
recovery of consequential damages depending on the circumstances of each case.
Though it appears to require mathematical precision, this approach actually allows a
great deal of flexibility. Courts can change the degree to which a factor determines
consequential damage recovery by altering the factor's coefficient or variable value.
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limited remedy to fail also resulted in the consequential loss, the
court should award all consequential damages to fairly compensate
the Buyer.
Other circumstances require only a partial recovery of conse-
quential loss to fairly compensate the Buyer. For example, assume a
Seller's failure to repair or replace results in an initial consequential
loss of $100,000. Replacement goods are available from other
sources. When the Seller notifies the Buyer that he will not repair
the goods, the Buyer refuses to purchase substitute goods and in-
sists upon repair. The Buyer's refusal causes an additional
$100,000 in consequential loss. The court should award only the
first $100,000 of consequential loss to fairly compensate the Buyer.
Because the goods were available from other sources, the Buyer
could have avoided the additional $100,000 loss.
Finally, a court should deny a Buyer all consequential recovery
in some circumstances. Assume that a Seller agrees to specially
manufacture machinery for the Buyer. Both parties recognize the
risks inherent in the experimental nature of the project, but agree to
proceed after extended negotiations. Despite good faith efforts at
repair, the Seller cannot deliver the machine as promised. The
court should not award the Buyer consequential damages. The
Seller acted in good faith and the Buyer should have reasonably an-
ticipated the event that caused the limited remedy to fail at the time
he assumed the risk of consequential loss.
B. Resolution of Current Problems
The problems inherent in the independent and dependent
courts' approaches fall into two broad categories: contract interpre-
tation and application of section 2-719. Both approaches threaten
to foster overly formalistic contract drafting and override the par-
ties' true intent by judicially presuming an intended allocation of
risk. The use of form contracts in commercial transactions com-
pounds this problem. In addition, both approaches' application of
section 2-719 create difficulties such as improperly dividing the
events of a transaction into separate time periods and presuming
conscionability in commercial transactions. Finally, neither ap-
proach adequately considers providing an equitable level of com-
pensation. The hybrid method addresses these problems more
successfully.
1. Interpreting Contract Language
A court's primary task in interpreting any contract is to deter-
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mine the parties' intent.73 Neither the independent court's strictly
literal approach 74 nor the dependent court's presumption of in-
tent 75 adequately determines the parties' intended allocation of con-
sequential loss upon the failure of the limited remedy. In contrast,
the hybrid method focuses directly on the parties' intent. If the ex-
plicit language of the contract does not clearly indicate the intended
allocation of consequential loss upon the failure of the limited rem-
edy, courts must look to extrinsic evidence to more accurately deter-
mine the parties' intent. In examining the extrinsic evidence, courts
must consider the parties' knowledge of the likelihood that the lim-
ited remedy would fail and the parties' negotiations of the issue.
Thus, courts following the hybrid method determine as accurately
as possible the parties' intended risk allocation and then interpret
the contract language consistently with this intent.
2. Applying Section 2-719
Section 2-719 does not expressly address the consequences of
an ineffective limited remedy on the validity of a consequential dam-
age exclusion.7 6 The section's silence permits several interpreta-
tions, including those of the independent and dependent courts.
The courts' approaches to section 2-719, however, generate several
problems. The independent court's view that the section requires
independent consideration of the two remedy clauses77 unfairly
prejudices the Buyer. The dependent court's view that section 2-
719(2) requires a full consequential damages recovery whenever a
limited remedy fails leads to inequitable results.7 8 The hybrid
method avoids both problems by interpreting section 2-719 in light
of its specific purpose and the general purpose of Article 2.79
The comments to section 2-719 suggest that courts should in-
terpret the section to provide a sufficient remedy to the injured
73 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.9, at 492 (suggesting that courts can interpret a
contract to carry out the intent of the parties only "in those relatively rare cases in which
the parties attached the same meaning to the language in question"; otherwise, the
court's job is more complex). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1)
(1979) ("if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight").
74 See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the independent
courts' strictly literal interpretation of contract language.
75 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dependent
courts' presumption of the parties' intent.
76 For the text of section 2-719, see supra text accompanying note 7.
77 See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prejudice that
results from evaluating the remedy clauses using separate time periods.
78 See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equity con-
cerns inherent in automatically voiding a consequential damage exclusion clause upon
the failure of the limited remedy in the same agreement.
71 For a general discussion of the purposes of Article 2 and section 2-719, see supra
note 24.
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Buyer considering all the circumstances of the breach-both at the
time the parties entered the agreement and during the performance
of the contract.80 Further, Article 2 recognizes the rights of parties
to formulate their own agreements. 81 Together, the specific pur-
pose of section 2-719 and the general purpose of Article 2 recognize
that the Seller's responsibility to provide fair relief for the injured
Buyer must temper the parties' freedom of contract. Any applica-
tion of section 2-719 must consider the parties' agreement and the
fairness of the Buyer's compensation under the agreement if the
Seller breaches. The hybrid method requires courts to apply sec-
tion 2-719 in this manner. A court must recognize the parties' right
to limit consequential damage recovery but must also consider the
circumstances of each case to ensure that the agreement fairly com-
pensates the Buyer.
By considering all the circumstances of each case, both when
the parties entered and when they performed the agreement, the
hybrid method avoids the prejudice to the Buyer that results from
evaluating each remedy clause in separate time frames.8 2 The hy-
brid method also avoids the unfairness that occurs when dependent
courts automatically void a consequential damage exclusion upon
the failure of a limited remedy. Equity does not require a court to
void a consequential damage exclusion whenever a limited remedy
fails. By examining the fairness of the Buyer's remedy under the
parties' agreement, the hybrid method ensures a more equitable
recovery.
3. Additional Concerns
The hybrid method offers no panacea. It generates some costs
not present in the independent and dependent courts' mechanical
approaches. For example, the flexible, case-by-case analysis creates
uncertainty for the contracting parties, and may engender some
overly formalistic drafting. Additionally, applying the hybrid
method requires much judicial time and sophistication. Thus, it
may further strain an overly burdened judicial system. These costs,
however, may be the price of effectuating the intent of the parties
while ensuring that the injured Buyer receives adequate
compensation.
80 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (sales contract must provide "at least minimum ade-
quate remedies" and a "fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties
outlined in the contract .... Where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of
circumstances fails in its essential purpose ... , it must give way to the general remedy
provisions of this Article."). See also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
81 For a discussion of Article 2's freedom of contract provisions, see supra note 53.
82 See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prejudice inher-




The hybrid method best resolves the issue courts face when a
contract excludes consequential damages and leaves the Buyer with
an ineffective limited remedy. Under the hybrid method, a conse-
quential damage exclusion clause is void upon the failure of the lim-
ited remedy unless the contract otherwise provides a fair measure of
relief. Unlike the independent and dependent courts approaches,
the hybrid method respects the underlying purpose of section 2-
719-to provide a fair measure of relief to the injured Buyer. The
hybrid method focuses on the intended risk allocation of the parties,
rather than relying on a literal or presumed interpretation of their
contract. The hybrid method recognizes the problems posed by the
use of form contracts in commercial transactions and the presump-
tion of conscionability of commerical contract terms raised in some
jurisdictions. Through this analysis, the hybrid method ensures an
equitable measure of relief for breach of contract.
Kathryn L Murtagh
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